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BIANNUAL SURVEY
treatment as may be of importance to him without having to
wade through matter that does not particularly affect his practice.
ARTICLE 2- LImiTATIoNs OF TImE
Continuous trespass: Statute of limitations defense disallowed.
In 506 Sixth Ave. Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority,'
a trespass action to recover damages, the defendant pleaded the
statute of limitations 2 as a defense. The court of appeals held
that an underground encroachment built in 1939 was a continuing
trespass, and although the right to bring an action accrued in 1939,
the three-year statute of limitations did not bar institution of
the suit in 1960.
The court distinguished a permanent trespass, which gives rise
to a single cause of action, from a continuous trespass. "In New
York, we have consistently characterized an unlawful encroachment
as a continuous trespass giving rise to successive causes of action.$ . ." ' The court reasoned that although the structure itself was
permanent, the trespass was continuous. Apparently, the court
considered that to allow defendant to successfully plead the statute
of limitations would, in effect, allow adverse possession without
notice thereof to the owner.
Periodic payments under an allegedly void lease do not constitute
separate wrongs for statute of limitations purposes.
Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shop, Inc.4 was a stock-
holders' derivative suit based on an allegation that a lease entered
into between the corporation and a principal stockholder was
either void or voidable because of excessive rental charges. De-
fendants contended that since the lease was entered into nine years
prior to the inception of the action, the statute of limitations 5
was a bar. Plaintiffs countered that each payment under the lease
was a separate, continuous wrong, and that they were thus entitled
to damages which accrued during the most recent statutory period.
The court rejected the theory "that each payment pursuant to a
wrongful agreement gives rise to a separate and distinct claim ...
The settled rule ... is that the statute of limitations begins to run
upon commission of the overt act causing damage." 6
" 15 N.Y.2d 48, 203 N.E2d 486, 255 N.Y.S2d 89 (1964).
2CPA § 49(7).
3506 Sixth Ave. Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority, 15 N.Y2d
48, 52, 203 N.E.2d 486, 488, 255 N.Y.S.2d 89, 92- (1964).
4235 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
5The court made no determination as to which statute of limitations
was applicable, as it concluded that plaintiff would have been barred under
the most favorable statute.
'Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shop, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 640, 644
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
195
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
A means of reconciling the cases involves an analysis of the
nature of the wrong. The rights and duties of the parties to a
contract become fixed at the moment of agreement. It is reason-
able that the statute of limitations should run from that instant.
In the case of a tort, however, each additional breach of obligation
will support a new action. A continuing trespass then, would give
rise to a cause of action each moment it exists. Thus, the statute
could never expire since at any time the injured party could recover
damages for the statutory period immediately preceding the inception
of the cause of action.
CPLR 203(b)(4): Inapplicable to service on out-of-state sheriffs.
In Bergstresser v. McCraig,7 an action resulting from an auto-
mobile accident, defendant, a Florida resident, moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of the statute of limitations. Plaintiff
countered that his service of the summons and complaint on the
sheriff of a Florida county was sufficient to extend the statute of
limitations by sixty days under CPLR 203(b) (4). The court
held that 203 was not intended to be applied to out-of-state sheriffs.
Therefore, service of process on a sheriff of a foreign state is in-
effectual for the purpose of obtaining the additional 60 days under
CPLR 203(b) (4).
Time requirement for commencement of tort action against munici-
pality: Section 50-i of the General Municipal Law supersedes
all inconsistent acts.
In Hianko v. New York City Housing Authority,$ an action
to recover damages for personal injuries was commenced within
one year and ninety days from the accrual of the cause of action.
The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the action
was time-barred, citing as authority Section 157 of the Public
Housing Law.9 The court noted that General Municipal Law
§ 50-e 0 superseded the Public Housing Law with respect to
the time for the service of the notice of claim.' Moreover, it
744 Misc. 2d 237, 253 N.Y.S.2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
844 Misc. 2d 365, 253 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
9 Section 157 provides, inter alia, that a suit against the authority shall
not be commenced before thirty days from the service of the notice of claim
nor after one year from the accrual of the cause of action.
10 Section 50-e provides for a ninety-day period within which to file a
notice of claim when one is required.
11 Hlanko v. New York City Housing Authority, 44 Misc. 2d 365, 253
N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1964), citing Robinson v. New York City Housing
Authority, 12 Misc. 2d 200, 176 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 8 App.
Div. 2d 747, 188 N.Y.S.2d 262 (2d Dep't 1959), aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 908, 165
N.E.2d 425, 197 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1960).
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